Evaluation of North Korean Refugee Protection and Settlement Support Program

  • 2016-08-11
  • 359
Evaluation of North Korean Refugee Protection and Settlement Support Program

Published July, 2016

As the number of North Korean refugees living in South Korea is expected to reach 30,000 persons in the near future, NABO has evaluated the Protection and Settlement Support Program for North Korean Refugees (FY2016 budget: KRW 202.3 billion), in accordance with the North Korean Refugee Protection and Settlement Support Act, and has suggested recommendations for improvement.

Highlights of analysis and recommendations are as follows:
First, the survey on North Korean defectors living in South Korea needs to have some additional items, including individual monthly average income as well as received livelihood benefits, household income, and assets. This will help identify their settlement situation more precisely, thus reflecting survey findings in program planning. In addition, legal provisions are needed for a stronger evaluation of action plan progress.

Second, more effective master and action plans need to be established. The reception rate of livelihood benefits shows a sharp decline to 29.6% by the 3rd year after the refugees cross into South Korea, but this rate continues to linger in the low 20% range from the 4th year. This implies that measures are needed to help strengthen refugee abilities to stand on their own feet through identifying, in the planning stage, the root causes behind this trend. Moreover, the proportion of women and professionals immigrating increased to 80.3% of the total in 2015, but their participation in economic activities and their wage levels remain low. The proportion of workers with an average monthly wage below KRW 1 million is higher among those whose residence support (given for five years) has expired (26.2%) than among those in the early stages of settlement (19.4%), while the proportion of regular employees among the former is lower (50.3%) than that of the latter (58.8%). Policy responses to these issues should therefore be included in the plan. 

Third, young North Korean refugees born in a third country are not defined as North Korean defectors under existing law. In order to provide education for them, a legal foundation needs to be established to allow master and action plans to be set up.

Fourth, the separately-managed budget and human resource support systems for the Hana Centers—government agencies assisting North Korean refugees with social adaptation—need to be integrated to increase their effectiveness. The Ministry of Unification and local municipalities need to monitor and supervise more closely those centers that violate the guidelines for budget formation.

Lastly, professional counseling services need to be overhauled as they fail to hire counselors who meet the qualifications for their position and have clearly defined roles and functions for them.